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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Recent Growth of the Front National: 
 
Although the Front National began as an outlier on the French political system’s 
fringes, it is today considered a key political actor with an extremely influe tial agenda.  
Its presidential and legislative results demonstrate a dramatic increase in voter support 
(please see Graph 1 below1).  In 1974, two years after the Party’s founding, Le Pen 
received less than 1% of the popular vote in the presidential election’s first round and in 
its first decade of existence the Front was largely seen as politically irrelevant2.  Yet, FN 
electoral support greatly increased in the 1980s.  More specifically, in 1983 the party 
 saw a breakthrough in the city of Dreux’s municipal elections when Jean-Pierre Stirbois 
captured 16.7% of the vote.  Such a victory gave Le Pen and his followers greater 
                                                        
1 Additionally, see Charts 1 and 2 in Appendix 
2 In fact, in 1981 Le Pen was not even able to secure the 500 signatures from the "grand electors" necessary 
to run in the presidential election.   
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Graph 1: Votes for the Front National
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legitimacy and a national audience.  This effect was compounded in 1984 with the 
Front’s attainment of 10% of the vote in European elections and in 1986 when the party 
won thirty five National Assembly seats (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005).  By 1988, after 
receiving 14% of the popular vote in the first round of the presidential election, Le Pen 
was an undeniable force in French politics.   
If the 1980s saw the Front's breakthrough, then the 1990s were about the party's 
endurance and quest for permanence (DeClair, 1999).  In the presidential election of 
1995, Jean-Marie Le Pen came in third place with 15% of the vote.  The Front capitalized 
on this momentum and went on to win several municipal elections3 (Davies, 1999).   
Shockingly, in 2002, just twenty seven years after the party’s founding, Le Pen was the 
runner up to the presidency with just under one fifth of the vote (17.79%).   Via these 
consistent electoral returns of about 15% of the vote from the period of 1988-2002 the 
party has secured what appears to be a stable presence in French politics4. 
At face value, this increase in voter support over the last twenty years is quite 
surprising.  After all, France is a state with a long history of democracy and 
republicanism whose national motto is “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité5”.  Throughout the 
20th century, French voters have generally valued multiculturalism and taken 
predominantly liberal positions.  For instance, the Communist and Socialist Party have 
had remarkably prominent roles and influenced much of the national agenda (Mcmillan, 
                                                        
3 For example, in 1995, Daniel Simonpieri won in Marignane with 37% of the vote and Jean-Marie Le 
Chevallier won in Toulon with 37%.  Additionally, in 1997, Catherine Mégret, won the municipal election 
of the Vitrolles commune in the Bouches-du-Rhône department with an absolute majority of 52.48% of the 
vote. 
4 Similarly, in the legislative elections, after a steep rise in the early 1980s, the FN has consistently won at 
least 10% of the vote.  It peaked in 1997 with 14.95% in the first round and 5.7% in the second round. 
5 Meaning “Liberty, equality, fraternity” where fraternity means brotherhood. 
 5 
2003).  In fact, even in comparison to a country such as the United States, France is fr 
less conservative and far more progressive (Pierce, 2001).  Yet, the Front, a radically 
right wing party with authoritarian tendencies and xenophobic positions6, is achieving 
consistently strong electoral returns.  This is a party whose controversial l ader has, 
among other things, denied the occurrence of the Holocaust7 nd been accused by French 
newspapers of torturing Algerians (Le Monde, May 2003).  How does one reconcile the 
France of such thinkers as Rousseau, Weil, and Sartre, with the France of the Fr n  
National?   
What Drives Le Pen’s Success? 
My thesis will identify the factors that drive Le Pen’s success.  This succe s must 
be understood in the context of French political history.  The Front has united various 
national right wing movements of old.  This is impressive considering their diversity and 
complicated historical legacies.  Le Pen holds these groups together by adopting their 
diverse authoritarian, nationalist, xenophobic, and traditionalist values.  He is aided in 
this endeavor by the sheer force of his personality.  I will argue that the Front National’s 
success is based on Le Pen’s ability to identify a niche in the French political landscape.  
The driving factors behind filling this niche have been the FN’s protest appeal and its 
anti-immigrant stances.  First, Front support gives voters a way of punishing the political 
establishment and therefore is a manifestation of French disillusionment with mainstream 
parties.  This disenchantment with political institutions reflects the recent convergence of 
the traditional Right and Left.  The malaise associated with the state’s governmental 
                                                        
6 One need only look as far as the FN’s website to see the extent of its xenophobic stances: 
http://www.frontnational.com/programmeimmigration.php.  
7 As recently as 2006, Le Pen called the Holocaust “a minute point in history” (Le Monde, July 2006).   
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institutions is in large part due to the nation’s transition from an industrial to a post-
industrial state in a more globalized century.  Secondly, the party caters shamelessly to 
the anti-immigrant fears of its supporters who are threatened by the vast increase in 
immigrant arrivals in recent years (see Figure 1 in Appendix).   
The Front National as a “Niche Party”:  
The salience of the FN’s stance on immigration can be better understood in 
relation to Bonnie Meguid’s contemporary work on niche parties (2005)8.  She defines 
niche parties as small political groups that have emerged in the last thirty yea s via their 
emphasis on previously ignored issues such as the environment or regionalism.  The 
Front National can be characterized as such a party because it has systematically 
constructed its political identity based predominantly on its anti-immigrant posi ions.  
Niche Parties are different from mainstream parties9 in everal significant ways (2005).  
First, they reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics.  Essentially this means 
that they prioritize sets of issues which have been generally sidelined amidst party 
competition.  Secondly, niche parties raise issues that are outside the existing spheres of 
political discussion.  In this sense, they are able to appeal to voters across the political 
spectrum10.   For example, the Front National clearly emerges from a right-wing tradition 
in France, yet it has also been able to capture French Communist Party voters (Baldwin-
                                                        
8 In this article she relies on evidence from case studies in party interaction to examine the effect of 
mainstream party responses to rising green and radical right party in advanced industrial Western Europe 
democracies on electoral results.  She specifically focuses on green and radical right party vote in 17 
Western European countries from 1970 to 2000.   
9 Where mainstream parties are defined as “electorally dominant actors in the center-left, center, and 
center-right blocs on the Left-Right political spectrum” (Meguid, 2005).  In France, this includes the
variants of existing socialist, liberal, and conservative parties.  This classification explicitly excludes left-
libertarian, right-authoritarian, or right-wing, poulist parties, etc. 
10 For example, in Great Britain in 1989 British Conservatives moved to the Green Party (O’Neill, 1997).  
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Edwards and Schain, 1994).  Finally, niche parties also tend to have a fairly restrictiv  
platform.  They bypass policy positions common to mainstream political actors and ather 
focus on a designated set of concerns.  This is evident in the FN’s lack of a coherent 
program for the French economy.   
Why is Understanding the Success of Parties Such as the Front 
National Relevant? 
 
Furthering academic understanding of niche parties is important because such 
groups are increasingly prevalent in Western Europe and acquiring greater influence11.   
In fact, there has been an unprecedented rise in extreme right parties, beg nning in the 
1970s and gaining strength and attention in the 1980s and 1990s (Kitschelt, 1995).  It is 
no coincidence that the last fifteen years have seen greater activity from extremist parties 
in almost all the European countries, including Austria (i.e. the Austrian Freedom Party 
or FPO), Belgium (Vlaams Belang), and Italy (La Liga Norte) among others.  Of course, 
these groups have seen varying electoral results12 and the Front National remains unique 
due to itsimpressive and stable success.  In this sense, the party is a worthy example for 
the consideration of a general phenomenon.   
The Front National must also be understood in that it represents a potentially 
dangerous force in European politics and societies (Tamir-Bar-On, 2007).  It 
demonstrates how extremist actors can become normalized in the collective national 
conscious.  The Front has been one of the only parties in France to see dynamic political 
                                                        
11 Meguid notes that in the past thirty years, “approximately 110 niche parties have contested elections in 
18 countries”.  These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, an 
the United Kingdom.  She adds that since 1960 over half of the green, radical right, and ethno-territoial 
parties in Western Europe have held seats in their national legislatures, almost 10% of them have 
participated in coalition governments, and the participation of over half of those parties was pivotal to the 
formation of majority governments (2005). 
12 Only 24% manage to receive as much as 5% of the national vote (Mackie and Rose, 1997).   
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growth in the last ten years (DeClaire, 1999).  Le Pen’s success intrinsically threatens the 
electoral and governmental dominance of the traditional right and left.  As will be 
discussed later, in transposing Meguid’s arguments onto the strategies of established 
French parties, it would appear that such actors have a tactical choice betwe n 
converging and diverging towards the Front’s positions.  Therefore, the French political 
system in its entirety has been affected by Le Pen’s illiberal discoure and immigration as 
an issue is increasingly portrayed in line with the concerns of the Front National (Schain, 
1996).  For instance, to see how the FN’s basic vocabulary has infused mainstream 
language, one need only look as far as Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign and 
its unabashed rightist themes13.   
Furthermore, the Front National’s prominence has also proved problematic for 
those seeking authentic democratic discussion.  It is argued that the presence of such a 
radical group prevents a proper national debate on important questions from taking plce 
(Tribalet, 2003).  After all, a great deal of time and energy is spent merely on discrediting 
Lepenist discourse, at the expense of real discussion.   Issues that the Front does push to 
the forefront are often done in a manner that hurts the debate.  Perhaps most strikingly, its 
presentation of immigration leads to incoherence, oversimplification, and untruth on the 
issue (Brubaker, 1996).  Increasingly, Le Pen’s “droit a la difference”14 d piction of 
citizenship is accepted by the public.  Such distortion is not to be taken lightly as it has 
                                                        
13 In the Herald Tribune on June 24, 2005  Manuel Aeschlimann, the UMP’s top pollster, in describing 
Sarkozy’s courtship of FN voters said, "The idea is to try to win voters who are not naturally inclined to 
vote for Nicolas Sarkozy, but who will do so if he addresses their demands." 
14 Herein, it is the ‘real’ French and only they who ave their own right to be different, giving them the 
supreme right to preserve their own ‘identity’ from unwanted admixture with immigrants.   
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repercussions in the policy domain and creates a climate where racial and cultural 
discrimination become more prevalent (Brubaker, 1996).   
In sum, the question of the FN’s electoral success is relevant because it relats to 
the conditions that give rise to extremism, and says something about party interaction and 
the effect of niche parties on the general political debate.  The answers in relation to this 
study of the Front National may provide a better understanding of similar phenomena in a 
larger context.   
Organization of the Thesis: 
In my first section, I will begin by laying out a history of the far right in modern 
France and the influences of these ideologies on Le Pen’s party.  I will argue that Le Pen 
united various strands of right wing political thought and that the Front National is the 
latest reincarnation of these traditions.  In my second section, I will argue that the FN’s 
voters are united by sentiments of disillusionment with mainstream parties nd a sense of 
socio-economic deprivation.  They are dismayed by the extent to which the moderate 
right and left have converged.  This opens up space on the political landscape for actors 
positioned away from the center.  In response, Le Pen positions himself as the anti-
establishment candidate.  I will use the election of 2002 as an example and argue th t th  
Front’s extraordinary success that year reflects voter desire to punish the traditional left 
and right.  My third section will argue that Le Pen has also attracted voters by blaming 
immigrants for France’s problems and making xenophobic and nationalist appeals.  I will 
then consider the tactics that mainstream parties may adopt in response to a niche party 
like the Front.  Here, I will use the presidential election of 2007 as an example of how 
Sarkozy usurped Le Pen’s discourse and was thus able to marginalize the FN’s appeal.  
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THE FAR RIGHT IN MODERN FRENCH 
HISTORY:  
 
Historically, France’s right wing movements have been marked by a variety of 
values.  Most notably, these have included authoritarian inclinations, populism, 
traditionalistic social views, and nationalist rhetoric with anti-Semitic and xenophobic 
undertones.  These movements generally reject universalistic and egalitarian values, and 
even democratic competition.  The Front National, with its exclusionary view of 
citizenship, call for strong state leadership, rejection of Europeanization, and focus on 
law and order, follows suite.   In this section I will argue that the FN is the la est 
culmination of various French far right wing traditions.  Despite their distinct values, it 
has combined these groups.  I will argue this by laying out the extreme right wing 
evolution from the Revolution of 1789 up until the FN’s foundation in 1972 and 
identifying commonalities and important legacies within this transition.  Such a depiction 
will help to contextualize the niche in the political landscape that Le Pen has identified.   
 
A History of the Radical Right Wing in France from 
Counterrevolutionaries to Le Pen: 
 
With the French Revolution and its promoters came the development of a counter-
revolutionary rejoinder by a section of society and intellectuals who opposed 
republicanism and Universalist ideas.  During the Bourbon Restoration, from 1815-1830, 
these counterrevolutionaries were most notably represented by the ultra-royalists, a 
reactionary faction of the French parliament.  They were pro-monarchy to the p int of 
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being given the appellation “plus royalist que le roi” (more monarchist than the king) and 
they strongly opposed the constitutional monarchy headed by Louis XVIII (1815-1824) 
on the grounds that it unacceptably limited sovereign power (Winock, 1995).  They 
ultimately hoped to restore the Ancien Régime as it had been.  Due to a strongly 
restricted voting suffrage15, these ultra-royalists maintained a majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies and were able to be the dominant political faction during the reigns of Louis 
XVIII and Charles X (1824-1830). 
The 1830 July Revolution brought the Orléanist family to the throne (until 1848) 
and fostered a new permutation of the ultra-royalist strand, the Légitimistes.  This new 
group softened their views in response to the restoration and mainly sought to phase out 
the Orléans family in order to replace them with the House of Bourbon.  They saw this 
latter branch as comprising the true heirs to the throne.  In response, the Orléans b anch 
countered the Légitimistes by forming their own political group, the Orléanists.  This 
group rejected the monarchic rule favored by their Bourbon peers while also deeply 
criticizing the notion of a French Empire under the House of Bonaparte (Bonapartisme).   
They considered both to be inacceptable systems of submission as they put the rights of 
all men under one despotic ruler (Winock, 1995).  Yet, the Orléanists also worried that 
government in the hands of the masses entailed risk.  They found the ideal system in the 
example of the constitutional monarchy of Britain where the middle class w 
represented with a parliament (Pilbeam, 2000)16.  As the Orléanists ascended, the rival 
                                                        
15 The Constitution of September 14, 1791 called for a restricted suffrage whereupon only men, older than 
25 years of age who paid a tax of a specific amount (called the “cens”) were allowed to vote.  This 
monetary requirement prevented a large portion of the population from voting.  Then in 1795, the ruling 
was altered to include those who had participated in a military campaign.  In 1799, universal male suffrage 
returned, only to go back to the “cens” system in 1815 (Rosanvallon, 1992).  
16 They referred to this as the “juste-milieu”, a path between absolutism and liberal democracy.   
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Légitimistes and their deeply royalist tendencies were increasingly politically 
marginalized17 and many withdrew from active participation in the political sphere 
(Changy, 2004).  Both groups were weakened by their reluctance to work together and 
delegitimized by their repudiation of the French Revolution (Winock, 1994)18.  
Interestingly, differences exhibited between the Légitimistes and Orléanists 
survive to this day.  Their disagreement over the role of a monarch was essentially a 
disagreement about how much power should be granted to the executive branch, and right 
wing groups remain divided by this question.  For example, contemporary groups such as
the Alliance Royale continue to call for the return of the monarchy19.  Meanwhile, others, 
such as the FN, are not royalists, yet they share a preference for a strong executive with 
consolidated power.  Additionally, the Légitimistes and Orléanists passed down a close 
relationship with the Catholic Church.  This legacy remains visible today.  For instance, 
the FN has a large Catholic base (Mayer, 1999) and its deeply anti-abortionist sta ce 
reflects its Catholic values (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005). 
In 1894, the Dreyfus Affair20 altered the political landscape completely.  It 
crystallized French political divisions that would be visible for decades to come and 
made nationalism the strongest component to right wing ideology.  This political scandal 
with anti-Semitic overtones revolved around Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the 
                                                        
17 Eventually, despite remaining popular with a large (if relatively insignificant) part of the old aristocracy, 
the death of the Comte de Chambord in 1883 effectivly dissolved the Légitimistes as they considered him 
the last surviving heir.  He was offered the throne, but he refused it on the grounds that it would have been 
at the head of a constitutional monarchy. 
18 Even as King Louis Philippe fell in 1848, the Légitimistes and the Orléanists remained divided, unable to 
agree over specific points (i.e. the declaration of divine right in justifying a monarch’s rule).   
19 See the group’s website for political platforms: http://www.alliance-royale.com.   
20 For an account of the entire affair, see the book The Dreyfus Affair: A Chronological History by George 
Whyte. 
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French military accused of treason21.  Although the original charges against him were 
void of any evidence, the military engendered a cover-up to justify them.  They feared 
withdrawing the prosecution would lead to a scandal capable of bringing down the 
highest levels of the military institution (Doise, 1984).  This mentality reflects French 
self-consciousness and insecurity following its humiliating military defeat to Bismarck’s 
Prussian forces in 1870 (Doise, 1984).  Additionally, the case’s particularly anti-Semitic 
nature was a popular response to recent waves of Eastern European immigration (Cahm, 
1996).  This recalls contemporary France’s anti-Islamic reaction in the face o  increasing 
North African and Middle Eastern immigrants. 
The entire nation was captivated by the events that followed Dreyfus’s convicti .  
In effect, the Affair brought long-simmering alternative conceptions of state and 
citizenship under the national magnifying glass.  Left and right-wing contingencies 
opposed themselves vehemently over perceptions of justice, human rights, nationalism, 
and the role of the military (Cahm, 1996).  The Dreyfusards (supporters of the Offic r) 
tended to be socialists and republicans, while the anti-Dreyfusards were typically from 
various factions of the royalists, conservatives, or proponents of the Catholic Church.  
Those opposed to the officer’s cause shared a general sentiment that support of the 
nation’s military institutions took precedence over any unjust treatment shown to a Jew 
(Doise, 1984).  Meanwhile, intellectuals, perhaps most prominently Emile Zola22, rushed 
to the political fray, joined the debate, and voiced their outrage at Dreyfus’s treatment 
                                                        
21 A military tribunal convicted him of spying for the German empire.  
22 The writer Émile Zola sought to expose the affair to the general public in a famously incendiary open 
letter to President Félix Faure, published January 13, 1898 in the newspaper L'Aurore (The Dawn), and 
given the headline "J'accuse!" (I accuse!).  Zola's intent was to force his own prosecution for libel so that 
the emerging facts of the Dreyfus case could be thoroughly aired. The author’s worldwide fame and 
respected reputation brought international attention for Dreyfus.   
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(Whyte, 2005).  This showdown between the intellectual elite, the military, and the labor 
classes who saw themselves as threatened by immigration, has parallels to today.  The far 
right has retained a deep dislike of the very educated (Davies, 1999).  In fact,while 
inactive members of the labor market and the undereducated are proportionally 
overrepresented among FN voters, high level educated professionals and university 
students are vastly underrepresented (Mayer, 1999). 
In addition, the Dreyfus Affair accorded a monopoly over nationalist arguments 
and definitions to the right.  Nationalism had until quite recently been a concept 
dominated by the left and associated with the ideals of revolution (Smith, 2002).  Now, it 
was re-appropriated by the right into a form of ethnic selectivity, blended with anti-
Semitism and xenophobia.  It is noteworthy that the Front similarly places their 
understanding of the “French” nation at the crux of their value system and strategy 
(Rydgren, 2004).  Finally, the liberal side’s ultimate victory in freeing Dreyfus23 served 
to push the rightist movements to the fray of French politics (Cahm, 1996).  They 
increasingly defined themselves by their outsider status.  They embraced this position and 
enthusiastically rejected the mainstream society and intellectual elites who had disowned 
them.  If such a disavowal by their liberal counterparts, pushed far right wing groups 
towards extremist positions, it also united them.  After all, they shared a sense of loss and 
subsequent feelings of injustice and marginalization.   
The Dreyfus Affair also gave birth to new political groups on the far right.  Often 
anti-Semitic, with militarist, nationalist, and anti-parliamentary mentalities, they even 
exhibited violent behavior.  Perhaps the best example is the creation of Action Française.  
                                                        
23 Due to the public attention, the case was reopened in 1899 whereupon Dreyfus was reconvicted, and then
subsequently pardoned and freed.  In 1906, he was fully exonerated. 
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This new organization, originally mobilized in 1899 as a review in response to the 
Dreyfus case, became quite strong as a political party in the early 20th century, and 
endured into the 1970s (Prévotat, 2004).  More specifically, Action Française exemplifies 
the way old affiliations were abandoned and replaced with new associations, sometimes 
creating odd couplings.  In fact, Charles Maurras, the principal ideologist behind this 
group, was himself agnostic, yet as head of a monarchist movement, he strategically 
chose to advocate a Catholic revival (Prévotat, 2001).  He saw this religious emphasis as 
the necessary element for unifying the type of nation he envisioned.  Similarly, man  
Royalists allied with Action Française despite the fact that it had no intention of restoring 
real power to a king and merely sought to use the monarch as a symbolic rallying point 
towards the reformation of what it saw as a corrupt and inefficient Third Republic24 
(Prévotat, 2001).    
The pre-war period following the Dreyfus affair gave birth to themes prominent 
among Le Pen’s major platforms today.   Most notably, right wing groups increasingly 
defined themselves by their opposition to “outsiders” (Tombs, 1991).   For example, 
Action Française was a prominent proponent of a form of nationalism which described 
the nation as a pure entity which could only be kept strong by eliminating tainted ex ernal 
elements.  Charles Maurras himself stigmatized “internal foreigners” or what he 
identified as the Catholic, white, and born in France (Weber, 1964).  He entitled this 
conglomerate of perceived enemies as the “anti-France” and frequently blamed the 
nation’s ills on them.   
                                                        
24 This was not the only area where the Royalists and their new partners in A. F. differed.  Additionally, in 
direct contrast to the Royalists, the latter pushed for a restoration of pre-Revolutionary "liberties" to the 
ancient provinces of France (replaced during the Revolution by the departmental system) and a general 
decentralization.   
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In the early 20th century and into the interwar years, Fascism entered the French 
political culture.  Yet it was never as strong in France as in Italy.  Some scholars have 
argued that France was protected by Fascism as its economic crisis was not as severe as 
in other states (Remond, 1982).   Secondly, France had a deeper democratic tradition, 
which prevented it from turning towards Fascism.  Finally there are those that argue that 
the presence of monarchist and Catholic groups (i.e. l’Action Française) stifled interest in 
fascist doctrines (Sternhell, 2000).  Of course, there were a handful of groups with small 
followings and even smaller audiences that overtly declared themselves Fasci t25 nd 
acted out ideologies in line with Italian Fascism (Soucy, 1992).  Perhaps, Fascism in 
France would more accurately be portrayed as a propensity exhibited by certain groups 
than as a concrete political movement or ideology (Rémond, 1982).  Essentially, this 
propensity was a function of a reaction to rising groups on the left and the economic 
crisis of the 1930s.   It was defined by both a more radical turn towards nationalism and 
conservatism, as well as a search for a nonconformist “third way” alternative to political 
elites (Soucy, 1992).  These groups did exhibit the violent tendencies of their Italian 
counterparts.  The interwar years saw frequent military parades, stret brawls, 
demonstrations and riots led by far right groups, as exhibited by Action Française’s youth 
organizations who frequently instigated street brawls and engaged their opponents in 
scuffles (Sternhell, 2000).   
Nazi Germany’s 1940 invasion of France was the exceptional event it would take 
to put French Fascists in power.  Extreme right groups rejoiced at the fall of the Third 
                                                        
25 PierreTaittinger formed the Jeunesses Patriotes in 1924, which imitated the Italian Fascist style yet 
remained a more traditional authoritarian movement.   Similarly, in 1933, the wealthy perfumer François 
Coty founded Solidarité Française and Marcel Bucard formed Francisme, which existed thanks to subsidie 
from Mussolini. 
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Republic and joined the new Vichy regime en masse (Sternhell, 2000).  After all, as seen 
in the Dreyfus affair, their strong affiliations to the military organiztion ingrained them 
immediately into Marshal Pétain's government over occupied France26.  The new regime 
declared an all encompassing "Révolution nationale" program27 i ed at "regenerating 
the Nation" (Fieschi, 2004).   The Vichy government’s xenophobic rhetoric was put into 
tragic action as they willfully collaborated with Nazi Germany to a high degree.  For 
instance, the French police organized raids to capture Jews and others considered 
"undesirable" (Burrin, 1995). 
Such war time behavior followed by the fall of Hitler and the Vichy regime, 
immensely discredited far right wing groups.  They have been harshly criticized in the 
collective national memory and by historical accounts.  Even today they are still 
associated with the collaborationist government and Hitler’s atrocities (Berezin, 2008).  
This demonization solidified a mentality of isolation and rejection among them.  
Interestingly, contemporary Front voters have conceptions of politics and society that are 
profoundly shaped by their sense of “not belonging” (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005).   
This has affected FN political strategy and led to a party tactic of cultivating marginal 
identities.  Le Pen’s supporters have gravitated towards his anti-establishment claims and 
his refusal to apologize for morally questionable events in French history (Birnbaum, 
1993).  It would appear that the party has sought to provide meaning and refuge to a 
family linked by the sentiment of exclusion.   
                                                        
26 The National Assembly voted on July 10, 1940 to grant extraordinary powers to Marshal Philippe 
Pétain.  He held the title of "President of the Council" instead of President of France.  The Vichy Regime 
ruled from July 1940 until August 1944. 
27 Whose motto was Travail, Famille, Patrie ("Work, Family, Fatherland"), which replaced the Republican 
motto Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. 
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Although, at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the extreme right found itself 
pushed to the wayside, very quickly new derivatives of the far right again emerged onto 
the electoral scene.   Action Française itself was dissolved in 1944 yet remnants 
survived28.   The most prominent of the right wing groups in the 1950s were the 
Poujadistes led by Pierre Poujade, founder of l’Union de Défense de Commerçants t 
Artisans (Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans).  Poujade led an anti-tax 
revolt by small shopkeepers and peasants and experienced brief electoral success, before 
again being swept to the side by the Algerian crisis29 (Bouclier, 2006).   Such small 
businesspeople felt that they were suffering the most from financial reform while large 
industrial groups and corporations went unscathed.  Despite the brevity of Poujadism, its 
mantra that the establishment cared little for the daily struggles of the everyman is still 
exhibited today by the Front.  It is perhaps not all that surprising that FN supporters 
have conceptions of politics and society that are profoundly marked by feelings of 
subjugation to other social and economic classes (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005). 
Far right wing groups during this period were aided by the fact that in the 1950s 
partisan identification was low due to the size and complexity of the French 4th 
Republic30 (Converse and Pierce, 1986).  In fact, politics during this period were 
characterized by instability31.  With few enduring commitments to specific parties and an 
uncertain politic climate, voters gravitated towards De Gaulle’s rallying message.  On 
                                                        
28 The party was reformed under the influence of Maurice Pujo who created the newspaper Aspects de la 
France (AF) and it returned in 1947 as the counter-revolutionary movement, "la Restauration Nationale" 
("National Restoration"). 
29 The events surrounding Algerian independence and de Gaulle’s subsequent return to power divided 
them,  many joined the Gaullists, and the party was eliminated.   
30 Which lasted from 1946 until 1958. 
31 In a comparative study done in 1989 it was found that France has experienced more high-volatility 
elections in the post WWII period than any other country surveyed (Pierce, 2001).   
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June 1958, de Gaulle became Premier and was given emergency powers for six months 
by the National Assembly.  Six months later, he was elected President of France32.  The 
General was Catholic and came from a militarist background, both reminiscent of anti-
Dreyfusards characteristics, but he was not of the extreme right.  In fact, his republican 
and statist convictions helped create a mainstream right and its popularity mrginalized 
far right actors (Hauss, 1991).   De Gaulle had no interest in working with Fascists or 
anti-Semites, however the conservative Gaullist Party was nonetheless ab  to win over 
many of their traditionalist and Catholic voters (Hauss, 1991).   On the other hand, the 
Gaullists did lose pro-French Algerian voters by calling for the withdrawal of French 
citizens and thus freeing the colony.  In fact, some have still never forgiven the 
mainstream right for the loss of Algeria33. 
The Algerian War (1954-1962) elicited controversy in France and its 
politicization reunited old right wing extremists.  A group of the French military opposed 
to the independence of Algeria, formed a terrorist group called l’Organization de l’Armée 
Secrete (OAS).  Many of its members were former fascists and Action Française 
members (Kauffer, 2002).  Furthermore, many of its members were linked by their 
activity in various anti-communist struggles and this era is seen as having fostered 
influential anti-communist and anti-left stirrings on the right (Klandermans and Mayer, 
2005).  Clearly, there had never been much love lost between the two sides of the 
political spectrum but in light of the notion that the Left’s cowardice had cost France a 
piece of its territory, an even deeper antagonism set in.  The left’s inability to take serious 
                                                        
32 His party was called the Union des Démocrates pourla République (UDR) and won a comfortable 
majority (78% of the vote) in November, 1958.   
33 The “Pied Noirs” or former colonialist French-Algerians vote in high numbers for the FN (Mayer, 
1999). 
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action and truly protect the French is a point emphasized to this day by Le Pen.  This is
particularly obvious in the FN’s strict approach to law and order which it juxtaposes with 
its depiction of a lackadaisical and craven left34.   
Charles de Gaulle’s long tenure in power35 exemplifies the tendency on the Right 
towards populism and a single dominant leader.  The General himself advocated the n ed 
for strong leadership presiding over a powerful and well organized state, and believed 
that a ruler need to have the will to exert strength and keep his followers in line 
(Mahoney, 1996).  He fully trusted in democracy yet saw the other branches as somewhat 
tempering with the executive’s ability to operate.  Ever since the Bonapartist referendum 
on the Directory36, the right had exhibited a tendency to appeal directly to the masses for 
the consolidation of executive power.  Similarly, de Gaulle called for a popular 
referendum to replace the Fourth Republic thus bypassing lengthy institutional cha ge 
and the consultation of other branches (Hauss, 1991).    
Finally, de Gaulle was also extremely nationalist and pursued political grandeur 
(Mahoney, 1996).  To this day there is a certain French admiration for leaders who reflect 
the role and weight of history, and speak to a national memory of French greatness 
                                                        
34 For instance, the Front advocates the reinstatement of the death penalty.  Similarly, it has made law 
enforcement a recurrent theme and demands higher sentences for practically all crimes.  When in power, 
the Front often allocates spending towards security services such as municipal police. 
35 He was present in French politics beginning in WWII (as the leader of the resistance to the occupation) 
and through his Presidencyfrom 1958 until 1968. 
36 The Directoire executive (Executive Directory) was a body of 5 Directors that held executive power in 
France following the Convention and preceding the Consulate (From November 2, 1795 until November 
10, 1799).  This was commonly known as the Directory (  Directoire) era, and constituted one of the final 
stages of the French Revolution.  Such a government was the republican left’s attempt to answer worries 
about executive power.  It was not popular.  The Directory ended with the coup d’état referred to as the 18 
Brumaire in which General Napoleon Bonaparte overthr w the Directory and replaced  it with the 
Consulate of which he was a consul.  He would later declare himself First (and only) Counsel and then 
Emperor. 
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(Gaffney, 2004).   Voters are intrigued by the myth of the hero, and politicians deploy 
such conceptions into generic presidential discourse (Gaffney, 2004).   Interestingly, most 
fascist and radical right parties exhibit the prevalence of charismatic le dership 
(Kitschelt, 1998).  The Front National headed by Le Pen is such an example.  He is 
credible to diverse groups of voters because of his personal political skill and his party 
has been greatly aided by the sheer force of his charisma.  Additionally, Le Pen has 
cultivated a larger than life persona for himself and often attempts to evokethe 
strongman personality of de Gaulle.  His provocative comments and intriguing life story, 
often exaggerated by his followers, set him apart from other politicians. 
 
Le Pen Appeals to Tendencies From This Far Right History: 
 
The Front National has forged its identity in the context of this complex French 
far right history which can be characterized by sometimes contradictory tendencies.  
René Rémond, the historian and political economist, summarized such parties and 
movements throughout French history by placing them within three different currents 
(1982).  He famously identified these groupings as; Légitimism, Orléanisme, and 
Bonapartism, noting that each appeared during a particular phase of French history.  
Bonapartism, is often characterized (in likeness to its namesake) by charismatic 
leadership, authoritarian characteristics, and populism37.  Meanwhile, Légitimism refers 
to 19th century royalists who refused to accept the French Republic and the new concepts 
of citizenry and nationhood that it introduced.  Adherents to this “counter-revolutionary” 
school of thought bemoaned the French revolution on the grounds that it would 
                                                        
37 Examples include Boulangisme and Gaullism headed by Georges Boulanger (1837-1891) and Charles de 
Gaulle (1890-1970) respectively.   
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eventually lead to catastrophe.  They feared what they saw as misguided liberalism and 
cited the revolution’s violent excesses as proof of coming national decline38.  Finally, the 
Orléanists, largely upper-middle class, were a more economically minded constituency, 
and somewhat less radical.  Its members prioritized the concerns of the bourgeois and 
small merchants.  This strand importantly initiated the liberal economic ideas of present-
day conservatives.  
More recently and based on a more empirical approach, Bert Klandermans and 
Nonna Mayer have argued that the Front National essentially unites two different families 
of the extreme right into one nationalistic, xenophobic, and authoritarian movement 
(2005).   Their alternative model, although quite similar to Rémond’s, describes two 
distinctive rightist traditions beginning with the right that emerged in the aftermath of the 
1789 revolution; a monarchist and Catholic reactionary group who rejected the spirit of 
revolution and the philosophy of the enlightenment.   The second grouping emerged later, 
developing primarily out of the Dreyfus affair, and is characterized by nationalism, 
populism, and anti-Semitism.  This latter cluster is embodied by the anti-parliamentary, 
fascist, and quasi-fascist groups of the 20th century.    
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s own life has unfolded alongside these varied extreme right 
movements prevailing in post World War II France39.  He was born in a small town in 
Brittany, a Northwestern region of France, to a devoutly Roman Catholic family.  World 
War II left a lasting effect on him, as he was orphaned in 1942 when his fisherman 
                                                        
38 Today, although some Royalist groups remain autonomous and active, most organizations of old are 
split; some remain devoted to the Bourbon dynasty, others have joined traditional Catholic movements, and
yet more have aligned with the Front National or de Villiers' Mouvement pour la France.  These are small 
circles but they are quite active. 
39 The following information and further information can be found in Le Pen: Biographie by Gilles 
Bressons and Christian Lionet. 
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father's boat was blown up by a mine.  He had to fend for himself and at quite a young 
age, he started selling Action Française's newspaper, Aspects de la France, in the street 
for spending money.  Later, he enlisted in the army, joining the foreign legion, and 
became an intelligence officer.  Le Pen was deployed to Algeria in 1957 and for the rest 
of his life would consider the loss of the French colony to be an abject failure on his 
government’s part.  His actual political career began when he headed the student union in
Toulouse.  In 1956, he was elected to the National Assembly in Paris as a member of 
Poujade's UDCA40.   A year later, he became the General Secretary of the Front National 
des Combattants (National Front of Combatants), a veteran's organization.  In 1957 he 
broke with Poujade and was re-elected to the National Assembly as a member of the 
Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP) party, led by Antoine Pinay.  He 
gained further political experience when he directed the 1965 presidential campaign of 
far-right candidate Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour41. 
Michel Winock, a prominent French historian, characterizes the Front National as 
the conjunction of all far-right French traditions: the counter-revolutionaries, fascists, the 
pétainistes42, and OAS members (1994).  In fact, scholars have found the relative 
diversity of the party’s electorate to be exceptional compared to that of other extremist 
parties in Europe and they hypothesize that this is perhaps due to its fusion of various 
ideologies (Klandermans and Mayer, 2005).  It is quite telling in terms of right w ng 
historical influences, that members generally see themselves as monarchist, Catholic, and 
often have ties to the anti-communist right and affiliations to French Algerian networks 
and communities (Kitschelt, 1998).  Additionally, many FN members claim to have 
                                                        
40 At the age of twenty-eight, Le Pen was the youngest member of the Assembly.   
41 Tixier-Vignancour obtained 5.19% of the votes in the first round. 
42 The name given to collaborationists supporting Marsh l Petain under Vichy France. 
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belonged to and been active among the far right family even before 1945 (Klandermans 
and Mayer, 2005).  Surely, this is a reflection of Le Pen absorption of practically all the 
parties of the extreme right (with the exception of neo-Nazi groups).  In fact, at the
party’s founding in 1972, Le Pen chose to incorporate older generation of right wingers 
into his new movement; he enlisted former O.A.S. member Jacques Bompard, and former 
Collaborationist Roland Gaucher, among other relics of Vichy France, neo-nazi groups, 
and Catholic fundamentalists (Davies, 1999)43. 
This diversity is quite impressive considering the fact that these various far right 
families (i.e. Traditionalist Catholics, royalists, neo-fascists, etc.) are fiercely 
independent, sectarian, and ultimately share few ideals apart from a distrust of liberal 
democracy and staunch anti-communism.  It is in fact somewhat odd that such different 
groups have been united under the Front National banner.  For instance, Le Pen does well 
among the “petit bourgeois” or the small independent craftspeople, shopkeepers and 
farmers who recall the Poujadists of the past (Mayer, 1999).  One might think that this 
group would have different priorities than Le Pen’s other large voting bases; blu  collar 
workers and residual populations without employment44.   The diversity of his supporters 
manifests itself in Le Pen’s often contradictory positions.  For example, the Front 
National has oddly called for vigorous state paternalism while also endorsig free market 
capitalism.  At times it demands a strong welfare state to protect families in need45 and 
                                                        
43 Additionally, in the beginning of the 1980s, various old Action Française figures, such as Georges-Paul 
Wagner and Philippe Colombani joined the ranks of the FN.  Similarly, in this period, royalists such as 
Michel de Rostolan, Thibault de la Tocnaye and Olivier d'Ormesson joined the party, identifying it as 
upholding the goals of their royalist movements. 
44 This includes pensioners, homemakers, and the unemployed (Kitschelt, 1998).  
45 Throughout the late 1990s Le Pen increasingly tried to depict the FN as the “party of welfare” (Davies, 
1999).  Additionally, in what Bourseiller describes as “calculated populism”, the FN has sought support via 
its social work channels and volunteering activity among local communities (1991). 
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supports protectionist policies such as tariffs on cheap imports (Bourseiller, 1991).  At 
other times the party rejects redistributive schemes, advocating for the reallocation of 
resources through market institutions and calling for tax cuts (Kitschelt, 1998).  This is 
inconsistent.  Of course, most politicians are not innocent of pandering to diverse 
interests, yet Le Pen’s actions are more egregious.  It would appear that he is 
demagogically telling voters what they want to hear, when they want to hear it. 
Finally, it should also be noted that over the course of its long history, portions of 
the extreme wing in France have evolved towards a belated acceptance of the French 
Revolution’s republican ideals.  In comparing the Front to its aforementioned post-
Revolutionary ancestors or to today’s fervent royalists, it is of note that, unlike them, the 
FN has accepted the political legacy of 1789 and now participates in the democratic 
electoral process.  Le Pen for all his extremist rhetoric and vehement criticisms is 
essentially willing to partake in the political system’s institutions.  It is this choice that 
has truly allowed the FN to progress and gain power and it is a defining difference 
between the Front and other far right factions (Remond, 1983)46. 
Conclusion: 
In sum, the FN is the latest incarnation of a historically multifaceted right.  Le 
Pen’s Front National reflects the legacy of a right wing that supported authoritarian 
measures, embraced nationalism, rejected “outsiders”, and felt marginalized by the 
political establishment.  Part of the Front National’s success has been its ability to unite 
these different groups under its leadership.  The question that now poses itself centers on 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
46 This is a point of contention in academic circles.  Fore xample, Pascal Perrineau disagrees and cites Le 
Pen's statements against the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as clear signs of the 
party’s opposition to the French Revolution (1997). 
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the basis of the party’s appeal to voters.  In the next section I shall describe Le Pen’s 
protest appeal as the driving force behind his support. 
 
LE PEN AND THE PROTEST VOTE  
Introduction: 
Numerous scholars have contributed to the debate on what drives the Front’s 
electoral success.  These different theories each have their merits.  In this section I will 
consider these arguments and argue that a driving force behind Front National support is 
its protest appeal.  This relates to niche party theory; as people become disaffected with 
existing parties, political space for new parties opens up47.  Le Pen voters generally have 
sentiments of political alienation and disillusionment with established elites. They see 
their participation in elections as one of the sole means left to them by which they may 
express this dissatisfaction.  In voting for Le Pen, they are sending a signal to the 
moderate right and left.   Supporting the Front is therefore a form of mainstream 
punishment.   
 
Voters Choose Extremist Parties Due to Sentiments of Socio-
Economic Deprivation: 
 
Le Pen’s audience is predominantly made up of social groups that face or at least
believe that they face difficult socio-economic conditions.   Herbert Kitschelt, among 
                                                        
47 Rydgren argues that ideological space opens up based on political demand (i.e. the attitudes of 
voters) and political supply (i.e. parties).  A gap develops if the two diverge and then voters turn to 
new sources of identification and representation that fill this gap (2004).   
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others, explains Front National success based on the challenges that large European 
social democracies face in the globalized age (1995).   All of Europe has seen a period of 
transformation where the rising prosperity of early postwar decades gave way to lower 
growth, higher inflation and unemployment (Pharr and Putnam, 2000).  Additionally, 
today’s economic interdependence and cross border mobility has transformed the ways in
which national leaders and institutions operate, in effect marginalizing political 
organizations of old.   In essence, post-industrial globalization means that the political 
autonomy of the nation-state is diminished and its latitude for egalitarian redistribution 
and social insurance is circumscribed (Bardhan, Bowles and Wallerstein, 2006).  Thus, 
Kitschelt’s school of thought makes the institutionalist argument that the welfare state is 
increasingly ill-equipped to deal with contemporary challenges.  As citizens grapple 
amidst these dissatisfactory conditions they turn to extremist actors wh  offer an 
alternative form of governmental representation.  
Some socio-economic arguments also relate Europeanization to FN success.  It is 
asserted that transnational institutions have limited the capabilities of governments 
(Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006).  Supranational organizations such as the E.U. mean less 
national autonomy in key areas of economic policy and so states’ intricate system  of 
social protections cannot always survive.  In response the FN offers a vision of a more 
powerful France, standing up to the dangers of European Federalism48 and reclaiming its 
historical independence (Davies, 1999).  Additionally, it is argued that political el tes 
have proved incapable of guiding their citizens through the processes of change and 
                                                        
48 The Front National was also one of several parties that backed France's 2005 rejection of the Treaty for a 
European Constitution. In Le Pen's opinion, France should not join any organization that could overrule its 
own national decisions.  
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acclimating them to their new 21st century identities.  Berezin in particular cites 
numerous examples including the Amsterdam Treaty and its perceived failure in the eyes 
of the French citizenry who saw themselves as inadequately consulted by the government 
in regards to the treaty.   She argues that as a result of Europeanization voters are left 
grasping confusedly for their old identifications and thus cling to a party with such 
simplistic and unabashed nationalism (2008).   
Institutionalist theories note that because groups are finding themselves without 
cultural or economic capital and in a situation of social decline and status deprivation, 
they are increasingly disenchanted with the political organisms in charge.  As a result, 
voters become susceptible to extremists.  This is perhaps because as voter loyalty to ld 
affiliations decreases, the electoral arena opens up and political resourc s are freed for 
new actors (Rydren, 2004).   Kitschelt emphasizes sentiments of powerless and argues 
that popular mood depends overwhelmingly on the distribution of income, market power, 
and sentiments of opportunity.  He concludes that for some of the electorate, these needs 
are going unanswered.  The frustration of disenfranchised groups often expresses its lf 
via an attraction to extreme political choices and a rejection of democratic sys ems (Bar-
On, 2007).  Certainly in France, voters living under conditions of real or perceived 
deprivation are far more prone to vote for the Front National49 (Kitschelt, 1995).  It is 
noteworthy that such extreme right parties are far less present in countries where the post-
industrial welfare state is not present (i.e. Greece, Spain, or Ireland).  
I will use the next two sections to add to such arguments and deepen an 
explanation of FN success by focusing on the French context.  
                                                        
49 They also are more likely to hold authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and xenophobic attitudes. 
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Disillusionment with the Political Establishment: 
 
The rejection of political elites correlates to perceptions of their performance and 
citizen confidence in their abilities (Pharr and Putnam, 2000).   Unfortunately, they are 
not seen to be doing very well; academics have painted a picture of spreading 
disillusionment with political leaders and institutions throughout Europe (Newton and 
Norris, 2000).   More specifically, in France voters have become disillusioned with 
political elites due to the high levels of perceived corruption.  This is largely a r sult of 
several high profile cases in recent years50.  Similarly, the nation has seen a proliferation 
of events leading to the indictment and incarceration of prominent politicians (Tribalat, 
2003).  This is significant because in terms of setting a general political impression, 
French candidates are more visible to voters than parties (Converse and Pierce, 1986).  
There is also the sense that these same corrupt actors are always present and in power 
(Pierce, 2001).  This popular perception is not so far off.  France’s practice of holding 
multiple offices (“cumul des mandats”) has ensured that the available political positions 
are in the hands of a limited few.   Although “Cumul des mandats” augments elected 
officials’ status, experience, and resources, it also gives them hegemony over political 
power.  Interestingly, in countries characterized by patronage and clietelism, extreme 
parties using political populism and anti-state messages thrive (Kitschelt, 1998).  
Additionally, in the eyes of the French electorate, traditional parties have 
inadequately adapted to changing voter priorities.  The 1990s saw a proliferati n of issues 
which transcended the traditional right and left ideological categories such a  the 
                                                        
50 There is a striking correlation between corruption and citizen confidence (Bardhan, Bowles, and 
Wallerstein, 2000). 
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environment or Europeanization (Berezin, 2008).  Voter concerns no longer fit easily into 
the obvious domain of any traditional political party or traditional party position (Hardin, 
2000).  Similarly, the once influential Communist party now appears outdated.  This 
previously dominant party of the working class was discredited by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and has been in irreversible decline for the past few decades 51 (Milner and 
Parsons, 2003).  In response to such concerns, Le Pen portrays himself as an alternative 
to technocratic elites out of touch with reality and the needs of ordinary citizens (Davies, 
1999).  
 
Mainstream Party Ideological Convergence: 
 
As mainstream parties grapple for political power, they go through processes of 
strategic convergence in which they alternate government and join coalitions52 (Kitschelt, 
1998).   In France, this convergence between conventional right and left parties has lft
them indistinct in the eyes of some voters.  The former left-right antagonism ha  been 
reduced to a very short spread, such as those who prefer more generous welfare progrms 
to those who prefer somewhat less generous programs. Such convergence hurts 
mainstream party ideological credibility.  For example, French voters often lament that 
there is no clear difference between the economic policies of the mainstream right and 
left (Berezin, 2008).  This effect has only been augmented by confusing interactions at 
the elite level as old parties splinter, new organizations emerge, and individuals assert 
                                                        
51 Please see Figure 2 in the Appendix. 
52 A notable example is the historical movements of the European lefts towards accommodation with liberal 
capitalism.   
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themselves away from old allegiances in rapid succession53.  An example would be 
Sarkozy’s defection from Chirac’s RPR to form the new UMP; many voters would be 
hard-pressed to name key differences between the RPR and the UMP.   Furthermore, 
voters who tend even to the slightest degree away from the center feel alienated by 
converging mainstream policy positions.  Kitschelt argues that if there is relatively little 
distance between mainstream parties then niche parties see better electoral r turns 54 
(1998). 
Figure 3: 
 
                                                        
53 Complex coalition strategies obscure electoral choices for ordinary citizens and lead to uncertainty 
regarding party identification (Pierce, 2001). 
54 He specifically studies right authoritarian groups in the context of electoral coalitions. 
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The graph55 in Figure 3 clearly shows the extent to which the mainstream right 
and left have converged on policy positions.  Over the last twenty years, the right, the PS, 
and the PCF, demonstrate a systematic shift towards centrist orientations.  Additionally, 
the graph illustrates that as mainstream party policy orientation increased in similitude, 
the Front chose a more extremist direction, thus differentiating itself more.  The erosion 
in the dominance of the two bloc party system opened up space for political entrepreneurs 
such as Le Pen (Pierce, 2001).  The convergence of the established parties demon trated 
in the graph coincides with the Front National’s rising voter support in the 1980s.  Such 
Votes for the FN represent the manifestations of disappointment with the political system 
and are a means for the electorate to punish mainstream parties.  In this sese, th y are 
protest votes.  The Front National capitalizes on such conditions by perpetually 
positioning itself in direct opposition to this bloc of converged right and left56.  The party 
has sought to portray itself as outside of such a system and therefore implicitly superior 
to it (Simmons, 1995).  To drive this point home, Le Pen groups all the parties together in 
his rhetoric and refuses to take sides between them (Simmons, 1995).  
 
2002 Presidential Election as an Example: 
 
                                                        
55 The data used in making this graph comes from the Campaign Manifesto Project.  This incorporates data 
from various campaigns and party rhetoric from the end of World War II until 1993 (Klingemann, Volkens, 
Bara, Budge, and Tanenbaum, 2001) and recently has published similar data with some new categorical 
additions going up until 2002 (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, and McDonald, 2006).   
56 The Front National considers this tainted "establishment", to include other political parties and most 
journalists (Davies, 1999). 
Figure 5: Presidential Election of 2002 with Candidates and Percentage of Vote 
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The presidential election of 2002 exemplifies the consequences of French voter 
disillusionment towards mainstream parties.  Out of sixteen other candidates, Le Pen 
advanced to the second round alongside RPR candidate Jacques Chirac by procuring 
16.9% of the vote or 4.8 million voters57.  Shockingly, he defeated Lionel Jospin, the 
socialist candidate and an expected second round candidate, by 200,000 votes.   In the 
general election, Chirac beat him with 82.21% of the vote compared to his 17.79%.   
In a sense, 2002 was an anomaly58.  First, the Socialists were not competitive59 
and proved incapable of attracting the number of votes that usually edge out the Front.  
This was in large part due to the number of candidates running within the left’s ranks 
which fractured its total support base.  Secondly, on both sides of the political spectrum 
candidates were largely viewed as uninspiring.  In fact, Chirac and Jospin, the main 
candidates were considered unimpressive and even blatantly disliked (Gaffney, 2004).  It 
should be noted that a sizeable proportion of the French simply chose not to vote and 
                                                        
57 For more information please see Figure 4 in the Appendix and for a visual representation see Figure 5 on
the following page. 
58 As if to prove this point, such impressive results by the FN were not quite matched in the legislative 
elections a few weeks later where the party failed to gain a single seat and only won 1.85% of the vot in 
the 2nd round (Gaffney, 2004).  
59 Additionally the PCF had been in a state of declin for a while and were seen as ideologically irrelevant 
(Wilson, 2002). 
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abstention was quite high60.  Thirdly, the mainstream candidates were seen as 
representative of all that was wrong with the political establishment.  Chirac, the 
ineffective leader of the RPR, had been discredited by recent scandal and his party’s 
losses in the last legislative elections61.  Meanwhile, Jospin was seen as a poor leader past 
his prime after five unimpressive years as Prime Minister.  Additionally, their 
dysfunctional and competitive relationship within the unusual institutional configuration 
of cohabitation62 had alienated and disillusioned many voters.  A socialist and RPR dual 
executive added to the impression that mainstream right and left were one and the same, 
not to mention ineffectual.  This arrangement played into Le Pen's arguments that the 
political elite was corrupt, incompetent and that the major parties were actually one 
collusive unit hoarding power.  Adding to this mainstream party convergence effect was 
the fact that during their campaigns both Jospin and Chirac had sought middle ground to 
the extent that they did not disagree over any big issues and Le Pen was able to stand out.  
The FN’s ability to be noticed was aided by the post 9/11 media’s obsessive coverage of 
"l'insecurité" which amplified the importance of an area of positions which the party 
heavily emphasizes.   
Finally, particularities of the electoral institutions helped the Front.  France's two 
round presidential voting system meant that some of the electorate used their first vote to 
send a message, thus voting for Le Pen as an indication of dissatisfaction while fully 
                                                        
60 Please see Figure 5 in the Appendix. 
61 A coalition of the Left won the Legislative Elections of April 21, 1997.  Because Chirac himself had 
dissolved parliament called for these elections, hi reputation was hurt, and his credibility damaged (Lewis-
Beck, 1999). 
62 The French practice what Duverger called a semi-presidential system in that they have a Prime Minster 
and a President (1980).  In effect, the French constitution transposes a powerful presidency on to a 
traditional form of parliamentary government where th President’s Prime Minister and cabinet come from 
the majority in the National Assembly.  Thus, for an extended period of time, the Prime Minister and the 
President of the same government can be from different parties. 
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planning on using their second vote towards a candidate they truly supported (Gaffney, 
2004).   In this sense, they voted to punish the more moderate parties, not anticipating the 
real effect it would have.  Support for this can be seen in the fact that Chirac so easily 
beat the FN candidate in the second round.  Essentially, a two round voting system for 
makes the option of a Le Pen protest vote possible.    
Conclusion: 
In sum, in this section I considered institutionalist arguments for the Front’s 
presence such as Kitschelt’s theories about underlying socio-economic problems in 
European social democracies.  I also examined theories such as Berezin’s which relate 
the project of Europe to FN success.   I then focused more specifically on France and 
described disillusionment with mainstream parties as a factor leading to Front support.  
This is in large part due to the convergence of the moderate right and left.  The election 
of 2002 demonstrates how by supporting Le Pen in the first round, French voters sought 
to punish the mainstream parties.  In this sense, his second place finish gives credence to 
arguments that FN support is based on the party’s protest appeal.  In the next section I 
will add that Le Pen’s anti-immigrant stance is the other major factor in explaining Front 
electoral success. 
IMMIGRATION: A DRIVING FORCE BEHIND 
FN SUPPORT 
 
Introduction:  
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The French make their electoral choices based on both long term forces such as 
ideological positioning, which tend to be stable over time, and short term forces, such as 
the attractiveness of a particular candidate or a vote in response to a contemporary issue.  
Forces within the latter category are often related to sources and factorsof transformation 
that induce voters to depart from their historical attachments or ideological aff li tions 
(Pierce, 2001).  In my previous section, I considered structural forces which lead to 
popular disillusionment as a factor in electoral choice.  Now I turn to a short term force, 
rising immigration63, to explain voter choice for the FN.   In this section I will consider 
the arguments that assert that xenophobia has served as a catalyst for the success of Le 
Pen’s anti-immigrant party.  In this sense, the Front National is the quintesse ial niche 
party that Meguid describes; a party who has identified a popular position to which the 
major, more moderate, parties are not willing or able to cater without alienating their 
constituents.  I argue that voters have proven susceptible to this anti-immigrant position 
as it promotes a return to an idealized status quo and gives them a deeper ethno-national 
identity. 
 “Fear of the Outsider”: 
As previously discussed, some political scientists have argued that FN’s revival of 
fascist rhetoric and nationalist ideology is a symptom of the social democratic state‘s 
transformations as it adapts to an internationalized world.  They argue that in such 
capitalist democracies, institutional change has led to economic crisis.  In France, the 
situation is not helped by domestic disenchantment with elites and the convergence of 
                                                        
63 Please refer back to Figure 1 in the Appendix for a visual representation. 
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mainstream parties.  However, there are also other arguments to explain the Front’s 
success.  Academics such as Paul Sniderman, consider extreme right party success to be a 
response to the increasing multi-culturalization of Western European societies (2000).  
After all, with the decreased costs of mobility, immigration has increased64.  It is not that 
such theorists disagree with the arguments discussed in my previous section; it is that 
they consider immigration to be the factor that puts socio-economic worries into focus.  
In other words, popular discontent with economic cleavages is fomented by rising 
immigration.  For example, post-industrial Western Europeans form a connecti  
between their observations of the simultaneous occurrences of both high unemployment 
and the proliferation of immigrants.  In the French case, socioeconomic restructuring and 
economic downturns following the oil shocks of the 1970s altered the need that French 
employers had for (legal) foreign labor65.   More specifically, as economic expansion 
slowed down, conflict emerged over competition within the labor force and immigrants 
were portrayed as stealing jobs rightfully belonging to Frenchmen (Brstein, Rémond, 
and Sirinelli, 2003).  In addition, the sudden activity in policymaking to remedy such 
concerns introduced a large number of inexperienced elected local officials and 
administrators into important roles66.  Their political interests were not restricted to 
improving immigration policy and Schain argues that this rapid expansion of an 
immature network of partisan actors politicized immigration (1996).  The issue became a 
strategic means for attracting new allies or voters and its basic facts were often distorted 
                                                        
64 It is estimated that of France’s 61 million citizens today, 10% are foreign born.  Additionally, it is 
thought that between 200,000-400,000 unauthorized immigrations are living there as well (data from the 
Migration Policy Institute’s website: www.migrationpolicy.org).   
65 In contrast to the immediate post war period when immigration to France had been quite encouraged by 
the government (Schain, 1996,). 
66 Poor policymaking is problematic as intergroup social relations hinge on the government’s capacity to 
institute policies that facilitate immigrant integration (Ireland, 2004).    
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in forums of discussion.   Voters were repeatedly told by actors across the political 
spectrum that immigration was a deep problem and the cause of many national ills. 
Sniderman argues that, in addition to this scapegoating of immigrants, Europeans 
are also deeply ethno-centric67.  They have a high degree of antipathy and fear of “the 
other”68.   Such intolerant characteristics have been made more evident by rising 
immigration.  In fact, race and ethnicity are increasingly sources of dissatisfaction in 
Europe (Pharr and Putnam, 2003).  Cultural differences, particularly in France with its 
emphasis on secularism, are not easily accepted and their absorption is a long process
(Jenkins, 1996).  Additionally, immigration policy in France has focused primarily on 
controlling migration while also demanding assimilation from those that do stay (Schain, 
1990).  This couplet internalized an intrinsic link between definitions of “nationality” nd 
the formation of immigration policy into the French conscious.   It was commonly 
understood that being an immigrant implied having inherently opposed tendencies to 
French culture (Taguieff, 1988).  Sniderman notes that countries that exhibit strains of 
intolerance focused on immigrants and foreigners give rise to at least one political party 
publicly committed to mobilizing public resentment against these “outsiders” (2000).  
Such radical groups claim that immigrants sop up public benefits, spread disease, 
promote crime, and increase unemployment.  
 
 
                                                        
67 Sniderman argues that sentiments of intolerance refl ct experiences as adults in a large society and 
economy (2000).  He does not deny that there is an rr tional psychological root to such prejudice buthe 
adds that it is also engendered by the socio-economic circumstances of individuals. 
68 He argues that this is based on a fear of sharing power and resources with culturally and physically 
remote entities as discrepancies between actors’ interests might mean fewer returns on resources and 
power.   
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Figure 7: Immigration and the Le Pen Vote 
% of the population that are immigrants % that voted for Le Pen in 2002 Presidential Election 
 
 
SOURCE: http://www.insee.fr 
 
The Front National is such a party.  In fact, it does best among those who most 
see a tension between their interests and the increased number of immigrants in France 
(Rydgren, 2004)69.  The party has characterized immigrants in two ways: as illegitimate 
competitors for scarce resources and as factors behind the denigration of traditinal 
French culture.  Le Pen advances the notion that France as it once was; morally righteous, 
overwhelmingly White, Christian, and safe, is no more.  The party argues that this 
detriment is in direct correlation to the uncontrolled arrival of immigrants who denigrate 
national traditions and disrespect the system, thus tarnishing national identity70 (Davies, 
1999).  Unsurprisingly, the party finds some of its strongest supporters among those that 
                                                        
69 Please see Figure 7 on the previous page. 
70 More specifically, the FN laments the growing influence of Muslims from North Africa, West Africa, 
and the Middle East.    
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most see an erosion of tradition, habits, religion, and class loyalties (Pharr and Putnam, 
2000).   
The Front National is a Niche Party: 
Bonnie Meguid would argue that the FN’s anti-immigrant stance in response to 
such conditions qualifies it as a niche party (2005).  It is not that Meguid disagrees with 
institutional and societal explanations for the FN’s electoral gains, it is rather that she 
sees these theories as stopping short of telling the full story71.  B  citing several cases, 
Meguid notes that the aforementioned models cannot account sufficiently for the 
performance of specific small parties72.  Her argument is that these theories downplay the 
intrinsic role that other parties play in determining a niche party’s success.  Because the 
salience of a specific issue is anything but fixed, party strategies matter.  Meguid asserts 
that, as voters take their cues from political parties, it follows that a party’s bility to 
downplay or accentuate an issue can attract votes73.  A party’s ownership of an issue 
shapes its fortunes and its credibility in advocating policy.  In this sense, issues serv  as 
tools for a party to maneuver within its political environment.  Thus, Meguid might argue
that the Front National’s success is in large part due to its ownership of the issue of 
immigration.  
Mainstream Parties and Immigration: 
 
                                                        
71 For example, exogenous factors such as natural disasters or financial crises change the importance levels 
of issues.  Secondly studies have shown that parties can manipulate the perceived salience of issues within 
the political arena (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987). 
72 As shown in cross-national analyses of new party vo e, both sociological and institutional approaches 
stumble in the face of the numerous green and radical right parties that attract little support under propitious 
circumstances and significant support under inauspicious ones (Swank and Betz, 2003). 
73 In fact, issue positions are much better predictors of left or right placement than party preference 
(Kitschelt, 1998).   
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As the FN has increasingly politicized immigration, mainstream parties have ad 
to respond.  Even if a party's voter base is not directly threatened by the Front’ssucce s, 
it may suffer as Le Pen’s presence transforms national dialogue and the poli ical agenda.  
After all, the Front, via its continual barrage of xenophobic discourse, has affected the 
priorities of voters (Schain, 1996).  Even those that continue to support other political 
parties have become convinced that immigration is a top concern.  For example, in 1984, 
relatively few voters considered immigration to be a top priority. By 1988, a little over 
five years into the Front’s rise, immigration had become a prominent concern (Schain, 
1999).  In fact, voters ranked it among other top priorities such as social inequality, and it 
had vastly surpassed concerns about Europeanization, the environment, or corruption 
(Schain, 1999)74.  Indeed, what initially may appear to be an issue or party of short term 
interest can nonetheless leave a long lasting impact on the content of political debate75. 
The FN’s influence has meant that the mainstream right and left have had to adap  
their strategies in order to compete on the issue of immigration.  Downs famously argued 
that rational political actors choose policy positions to minimize the distance between 
themselves, other parties, and voters (1957).   It follows that if voters consider 
immigration to be a priority then mainstream parties must pick up on it or face electora  
losses.  Meguid refers to this as “issue ownership” and argues that parties can go so far as 
to manipulate the very salience of issues.  She asserts that niche party achievement 
reflects mainstream parties’ ability to either marginalize or usurp a niche party's major 
platforms.  Compounding the importance of such strategies, features of the French
                                                        
74 In fact, only unemployment held a higher spot. 
75 Meguid points to the fact that the environment andimmigration have become undoubted stalwarts on the 
campaign topic list in Western Europe, despite the common disappearance or marginalization of the niche 
parties that introduced them.  In essence, the succe s of a niche party issue is distinct from a niche party's 
electoral success (2005). 
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political system further propel immigration related issues into the competitive arena.  The 
French electoral system is that of a winner-take-all.  Unlike the multi-polar arty systems 
in other continental European countries which encourage complex coalitions across 
multiple policy areas, this has led the left and right to exaggerate partisan differences.  
Finally, it is possible for the issue to be used so competitively because of the relative 
newness of immigration policy76 (Schain, 1996). 
Meguid specifically focuses on the position mainstream parties take in reaction to 
a niche party's issue or what she terms mainstream party entry.  Essentially, as a niche 
party introduces or reframes an issue, established moderate parties must decide wh ther 
or not to recognize it and if they do, how they will respond and characterize their 
position.   A party may choose "non-action", or to deliberately ignore or dismiss an 
issue.  This is usually because they consider an issue too trivial or too difficult for them to 
address.  Such a move signals to voters that the mainstream party sees the issueas 
lacking in merit.  On the other hand, a party may also choose to compete with the niche 
party by taking a stand on the issue.  Merely in entering the fray, they do two things.  
First, they assume a role in determining the issue's dimensions.  Secondly, they legitimize 
the relevancy of the issue, making it part of mainstream debate, and thus altering its 
salience in the eyes of voters.   
 
Accommodative vs. Adversarial Strategies: 
 
                                                        
76 It is still undeveloped terrain.  In fact, no laws on immigration were passed by parliament between th 
end of WWII and January 1980.   Then, as macroeconomic and industrial policy ceased to be as divisive 
political topics, the political left and right seizd on new issues such as immigration. 
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Once the mainstream party initiates competition with the niche party within a 
particular issue space, Meguid argues that it faces a further choice.  It may adopt an 
"accommodative" or an "adversarial" strategy.  In other words, it may converge towards 
the niche party's position or diverge from it.  An accommodative approach undermines 
the exclusivity and distinctiveness of the niche's party's position.  Meanwhile, an 
adversarial strategy accords attention and distinctiveness to the niche party.  Therefore, 
Meguid advises mainstream parties to adopt strategies which give the niche party and its 
position as little attention as possible.  It should be noted that established parties do have 
certain advantages versus a niche party.  For one, they have greater legislativ  and 
governing experience.  Additionally, the mainstream party has greater acc ss to voters 
and thus may more easily publicize its issue positions and utilize brand recognition.   
In France, mainstream parties are still grappling with their approaches to the issue 
of immigration.  Some political groups have chosen accommodative stances in order to 
procure votes and divert political attention away from the FN.  Accommodative acons 
include the adoption of language and policies typically associated with the extreme right 
(Hainsworth and Mitchell, 2000).  For instance, Chirac's 1986 government tightened 
immigration controls, restored random identity card checks, and even chartered a plane to 
deport 1001 Malian refugees.  The Left77 has taken similar action; Edith Cresson while 
Socialist Prime Minister in the early 1990s enacted a Front-like policy of setting up 
detention centers for those seeking asylum.  Similarly, she gave the police extra stop and 
                                                        
77 One might assume that the mainstream left is not as vulnerable to Le Pen as the mainstream right.  Yet,
as Sniderman argues, the constituency for authoritarian values is in actuality not confined to the right.  This 
is because the correspondence between ideological self-conception and ideological commitments is 
imperfect.  In other words, some of those that consider themselves politically to the left actually hold some 
rightist beliefs.  In particular, Sniderman finds that those handicapped by limited education are mostopen 
to persuasion. 
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search powers.   In fact, socialists, communists, and trade unionists who once favored 
immigrants have shown a general trend of increasingly ambivalent commitments to them 
(Schain, 1996).  For example, the communist party, who is particularly threatened by the 
FN’s usurpation of their working class constituents78, distributed a text in the early 1990s, 
called Immigration: The View of the Communists, which although condemning racism 
and xenophobia, went on to relate drug, violence, and delinquency problems to 
immigration (Marcus, 1995).  The party issued this text as part of a general anti-
immigrant campaign which tied immigrants to criminality and housing scarcity.  
Mainstream parties have even gone so far as to make alliances with the FN to 
secure greater power or win specific elections.  The RPR and UDF have done this most 
frequently and generally in municipal elections.  In fact, in 1983 in Dreux (where the FN 
is seen as having broken into the national spotlight) the party’s success was in large part 
due to its unification with the RPR and UDF79 who feared that if divided they would lose 
to their leftist rivals (Libération, 2002).  Although rarer, the left has also lied itself with 
the Front on several occasions.  For example, in March 1973, Georges Frêche, a socialist 
candidate in Montpellier's legislative elections, encouraged FN voters (whose candidate 
André Troisehad been defeated in the first round) to ally with him in the second round 
against a UDR candidate (Alazy, 1989)80.   
Mainstream groups have also assumed an adversarial stance in response to Le 
Pen.  In fact, the rise of the Front has also seen a mushrooming in the number of national
and local organizations dedicated to spreading an anti-Front and pro-interracial tolerance 
                                                        
78 It is notable that as Le Pen's electoral results have risen, theirs have fallen tremendously (Schain, 1999). 
79 At the time, right leaders as Bernard Stasi and Simone Veil voiced their disapproval.  Yet, others, such as 
Raymond Arun, argued that such an alliance was the only way to defeat the Socialists (Giespert, 2006).   
80 This was odd considering Frêche had previously explicitly denounced the Front.  Yet, despite the rival 
UDR candidate’s substantial popularity, Frêche went on o win by about  a hundred votes.   
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message (Hainsworth and Mitchell, 2000).  For instance, in 1990, Socialist Minister of 
the interior Pierre Joxe reacted to the Islamic headscarf affairby inviting representatives 
of Islamic organizations to form a policy research institution towards the advancement of 
Muslim interests81 (Feldblum, 1993).  Additionally, some political leaders have made a 
point to denounce the Front and state their opposition to its ideologies.  For example, the 
major right parties have officially condemned the FN82.   However, when the right does 
take an adversarial stance to FN arguments, it continues to stress certain th mes as to not 
alienate or offend its more extremist supporters.  For instance, although Chirac’s Interior 
Minister, Charles Pasqua83, gave a generally positive speech at the inauguration of a new 
mosque in Lyon in 1994, his praise also emphasized the importance of "moderate" 
Islamic thought and the need for Muslim practices to remain compatible with French 
Republican traditions (Hargreaves, 1995). 
Accommodative stances can be quite challenging because of the contentious 
nature of niche party platforms.  The mainstream right in particular has attempted to 
benefit from its relative ideological proximity to the FN84 while not actually fully 
acknowledging their shared positions.  This is because in overtly projecting the Front's 
xenophobic elements, it runs the risk of alienating its voter base.   The break up of the 
UDF in the late 1990s illustrates this challenge (Hargreaves, 1995).  Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing’s UDF accomplished an impressive feat in the 1970s.   It rallied the non-
Gaullist right (i.e. economic liberals and centrist Christian democrats) and m naged to 
                                                        
81 Called the Deliberative Council on the Future of Islam in France (CORIF), it was an institution that 
would be the parallel of comparable organizations of Catholics, Protestants and Jews, by setting a unified 
political agenda and working towards Muslim’s rights. 
82 The RPR did so in September 1988, as did the Partirépublicain in 1991.  Candidates that continue to 
pursue such alliances are often punished by their organizations.   
83 A Gaullist politician. He was Interior Minister from 1986 to 1988. 
84 In contrast to the left, the mainstream right has the inherent advantages of having a stronger pull on FN 
voters simply as a result of its ideological foundations and history (Budge and Farlie, 1983). 
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create a party capable of countering Chirac's RPR (Berstein, Rémond, and Sirinelli, 
2003).   Even more impressively, despite being plagued with factional divisions it wa
able to survive the years.  However, in 1998 the UDF’s incorporation of Front National 
politicians into its ranks led to a crisis as various members of the party’s coalition left in 
protest.  This abandonment decimated the party and left it irrefutably weakened.  
Mainstream parties' often deal with this challenge by paradoxically ondemning the Front 
in public but nonetheless adopting its discourse.  It would appear that voters do not want 
to see an explicit connection to groups such as the Front but they do not mind imagery 
and rhetoric reminiscent of Lepenist positions.  For instance, while the Republican left 
publicly rejects an ethno-cultural definition of French nationality, it does call for a level 
of cultural conformity that infringes upon cultural diversity (Fysh and Wolfreys, 1998).   
 
The Presidential Election of 2007: 
The Presidential election of 200785 exemplifies how the mainstream right’s86 
accommodative approach was able to marginalize the Front’s niche party advantages.  
The data source I used for my graph in Figure 2 does not yet have information for 
elections after 2002, however I predict that future data claims would indicate the 
mainstream right now diverging from the left, an action that is having the effect o  
closing the niche that was so widely opened for the Front.   Essentially, Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s “copy” stance on the immigration issue became more attractive than the niche 
party’s “original” to voters.  The UMP captured portions of the Front’s voter base by 
utilizing a brand of populism mixed with deep conservatism.  In particular, Sarkozy won 
                                                        
85 To see election results please consider Figure 8 of the Appendix. 
86 More specifically, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP). 
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over older voters who often select their candidate based on concerns of security and law 
and order.  By increasing its emphasis on these matters during the campaign (See Figur  
3 on the following page), the UMP usurped one of Le Pen’s primary positions.  He also 
captured constituencies that are more accepting of authoritarian values, such as blue-
collar workers.  Furthermore, he went directly after Le Pen’s strongest base87 by making 
numerous visits to parts of theSouth and catering to the repatriated French Algerians 
there.  To such groups Sarkozy lauded France’s imperial past and appealed to 
patriotism88.  
Figure 3: Prevalence of Party Discourse on Law and Order in Campaign Rhetoric 
 
                                                        
87 Please see Figure 9 in the Appendix.  I have juxtaposed the regions Le Pen won in 2002 with the regions 
Sarkozy won in 2007. 
88 For example, he described Marshal Lyautey regime in Morocco as “enlightened colonialism”.   
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In 2007’s campaign the mainstream right also emphasized nationalistic rhetoric89 
and called for policies typically associated with the far right90.  For example, in debates 
and his campaign platforms, Sarkozy emphasized ostensibly anti-immigrant positions 
such as deporting undocumented immigrants.  Additionally, he frequently stressed 
France’s secular republican tradition, stating a refusal to make accommodations for 
Muslim practices.  A recurrent theme in his speeches was an opposition to the imperative 
of being “politically correct”.  He frequently attacked France’s “national repentance” and 
claimed that the time for apologizing for Nazi occupation and the colonial period was at 
an end.  Perhaps, he also gained an edge over Le Pen via his business knowledge and 
entrepreneurialist experience as he was identified as the natural candidate of France’s 
business leaders.  After all, Le Pen’s weakness in voter’s eyes has often been his 
economic incoherence.    
The election of 2007 also demonstrates the precarious position of a party that relies 
so heavily on one favored issue.  As Meguid notes, it is uncertain that niche party 
strategies can truly achieve political power while so reliant on the salience of one matter.  
This makes them especially vulnerable to mainstream party tactics.  The graph in Figure 
2 provides a visual representation of the FN’s move towards more central policy 
positions beginning in 1997.  Perhaps this recent attempt to appeal to mainstream voters91 
signifies the Front’s own understanding that to reap greater success; it mu t expand its 
                                                        
89 For example, Sarkozy borrowed a page from the Front’s xenophobic book and said things such as “Those 
who criticize France are not obliged to live here” that tapped into strains of racism and authoritarianism 
(RFI, 2006).   
90 Similarly, on the left, Ségolène Royal, the Socialist candidate, also emphasized French family values in a 
traditionalist vein and called for stricter measure to combat insecurity.  For example, she notably 
suggested that juvenile delinquents be placed under military authority (Telegraph, 2007).   
91 In his 2007 Presidential campaign Le Pen reached out to minorities and women with generally 
unsuccessful results. 
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platforms92.   Thus, the party finds itself at a crossroads: to stand by Le Pen’s original 
radical message might mean never attaining true political influence.   Yet, a more 
“centrist” strategy might compromise its uniqueness (Kitschelt, 1998).   For the FN to 
now become more moderate would antagonize extremist voters that want to see product 
differentiation.  In modifying his message, Le Pen would run the very serious political 
risk of alienating his base and losing the infamous brand he has marketed himself on.  
Additionally, in better defining itself, the party would reveal how loose an ideological 
foundation it rests upon93.  Furthermore, Le Pen’s own controversial statements prevent 
him from appearing credible as a mainstream actor.  After all, he has called for such 
divisive things as isolating those infected with H.I.V. by placing them on a quarantined 
island (New York Times,  and as recently as in 2005, Le Pen claimed that the occupati n 
of France by Nazi Germany "was not particularly inhumane"94. 
An instance that perhaps best exemplifies the debate over which direction the party 
should take, is visible in the debilitating 1998 split between Le Pen and his chief 
lieutenant, Bruno Mégret95.  At root was a disagreement over the basic strategy of the 
party; Megret, the deputy leader of the FN, wanted to make a tactical allance with the 
                                                        
92 Kitschelt has argued that although a niche party’s catalysts towards success are often based on a single
issue response, the party can only remain successful in the long run if it can identify a broader agenda 
(1995). 
93 Perhaps Rene Monzat says it best when he describes the FN as a “subversive right, devoid of real 
doctrinal coherency and ready to exploit any social, ultural or political malaise in France”  (1992).   
94 He has also said that “the Holocaust” was a “detail” of history (“Jean Marie Le-Pen’s notorious ‘detail’ 
remark”, 2002). 
95 In December 1998, Bruno Mégret quit the party to found what would become Le Mouvement National 
Républicain.  He was followed by other major FN memb rs who shared his view that Le Pen’s provocative 
behavior was limiting the party’s future.  This splinter movement attracted the majority of the FN’s 
departmental secretaries and city councilors who felt that in practice, Le Pen’s strategies were not givin  
them the sorts of results they believed could be achieved.  This divisive step led to a major reorganiz tion 
of the Front’s leadership and in effect displaced the party’s more centrist members.   
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mainstream right and thus integrate the political establishment96.  He thought that Le 
Pen’s “extremist” positions and anti-system approach were a limitation towards obtaining 
executive political positions (Hargreaves and Mitchell, 2002).   
Conclusion: 
In sum, like its right wing predecessors, the Front has capitalized on specific 
social, economic, and political conditions to attract support.  A surge in immigration, 
socio-economic transformations, and the erosion in the dominance of the two bloc system 
opened the way for Le Pen.  His party has made serious efforts to politicize immigration 
in a manner favorable to itself.  In this sense, the Front National is the quintessential 
niche party that Meguid describes; a party who has identified a popular position to which 
the major, more moderate, parties are not willing or able to cater without alienating their 
constituents.  It has portrayed immigration as a threat to French ethno-nationalis  identity, 
as a major cause of unemployment and criminality, and as the root to the problems of the 
welfare state entering a new century.  This characterization increased voter support and 
has meant that mainstream parties have had to strategically position themselves on issues 
such as immigration as well.  In fact, Sarkozy won in 2007 in large part because he was 
able to marginalize the force of the Front National by making its two largest foci, 
immigration and security, into his main political platforms.   
 
CONCLUSION:  
 
                                                        
96 At the time several conservative leaders demonstrated their interest in forming alliances, generally 
through regional councils.   
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I have sought to explain Le Pen’s Front National’s surprising electoral success in 
the last thirty years.   Although founded as recently as 1972, this party has done 
remarkably well for an extremist party; continually securing at least 10% of the popular 
vote in presidential and legislative elections.  First, I noted that the FN combines various 
far right wing traditions from movements of France’s post-Revolution past.  From this 
complicated legacy, Le Pen has created a party characterized by a rejection of the 
establishment, right-authoritarian themes, and a particularly potent brand of reactionary 
nationalism.  I argued that via the catalysts of nationalist and xenophobic sentiment, he 
Front has mobilized a portion of the electorate in its favor by manipulating popular 
dissatisfaction with the status quo.   In this sense, voting for the FN is a protest vote, as 
exemplified by the Presidential election of 2002, against mainstream elites and increased 
immigration.  Furthermore, I argued that because its anti-immigration stance is a driving 
force behind the Front’s success, then it is a niche party as described by Bonnie Meguid.  
Due to such characteristics, the Front’s success has depended on the way mainstream 
parties react to the immigration issue and whether or not they are able to marginalize it, 
or adopt it as their own.  I concluded by nothing that the Front faces a difficult course in 
the future.   Although, it may certainly retain its most loyal base, it is increasingly 
threatened by the mainstream right’s adoption of some of its rhetoric.   
Looking to the future, it is unclear where the FN will be in ten or even five years.  
After all, Jean-Marie Le Pen is today almost 80 years old and the Front National must 
know that it will not be able to depend so thoroughly on his pugnacious and charismatic 
personality for much longer.  The question of who will replace him has thus far has been 
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controversial97.  Yet, regardless of whether the FN will eventually fade from the French 
political scene, its current presence suggests that political extremists ven in the most 
democratic places may always achieve a degree of success.  More specifically, conditions 
of popular dissatisfaction, whether due to governmental failings, questions of identity, or 
economic insecurity, will create an audience susceptible to radicals.  The electoral 
achievements of the FN suggest that this is because such actors represent a form of 
protest for the electorate.  Liberal democracies must be continually wary of these 
extremist groups as they pose a very real threat.  For proof, one need only consider the 
manner in which Le Pen’s extremist agenda affects the entire political clim te of 
contemporary France, going so far as to influence government policy.   
                                                        
97 In 2003, Le Pen chose his daughter, Marine Le Pen,as the new executive of the party which led to 
contestation within the party, as other big FN players questioned this choice.  Party insiders felt tha such 
an undertaking was inappropriate and feared a possible family dynasty with no room for other power 
players (Simons, 2006). 
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APPENDIX 
 
  
Chart 2: 
 
Election year # of 1st round votes  % of 1st round vote # of 2nd round votes  % of 2nd round vote # of seats
1978 82,743 0.30% — — 0
1981 44,414 0.20% — — 0
1986 2,705,336 9.70% — — 35
1988 2,359,528 9.70% – – 1
1993 3,152,543 13.80% 1,168,160 5.10% 0
1997 3,800,785 14.95% 1,434,854 5.70% 1
2002 2,862,960 11.30% 393,205 1.85% 0
2007 1,116,005 4.29% 17,107 0.08% 0
French National Assembly Election Results
Chart 1: 
French Presidential Election Results 
Election 
year 
# of 1st round 
votes 
% of 1st round 
vote 
# of 2nd round 
votes 
% of 2nd round 
vote 
1974 190,921 0.80% — — 
1981 — — — — 
1988 4,376,742 14.50% — — 
1995 4,571,138 15.00% — — 
2002 4,805,307 16.86% 5,525,906 17.79% 
2007 3,835,029 10.44% — — 
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Figure 2: Communist Party Voter Loss 
 
 
Source: http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMParti?codePays=FRA&codeParti=pcf 
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Figure 4: Summary of the 21 April and 5 May 2002 French presidential election 
results 
Candidates Nominating parties Votes 1st 
round 
% 
Votes 
2nd 
round 
% 
Jacques Chirac Rassemblement pour la 
République 
5,665,85
5 
19.88
% 
25,537,95
6 
82.2
1% 
Jean-Marie Le 
Pen Front national 
4,804,71
3 
16.86
% 5,525,032 
17.7
9% 
Lionel Jospin Parti Socialiste 4,610,113 
16.18
%   
François 
Bayrou 
Union pour la démocratie 
française 
1,949,17
0 6.84%   
Arlette Laguiller Lutte ouvrière 1,630,045 5.72%   
Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement Mouvement des citoyens 
1,518,52
8 5.33%   
Noël Mamère Les verts 1,495,724 5.25%   
Olivier 
Besancenot 
Ligue communiste 
révolutionnaire 
1,210,56
2 4.25%   
Jean Saint-
Josse 
Chasse, pêche, nature, 
traditions) 
1,204,68
9 4.23%   
Alain Madelin Démocratie libérale 
1,113,48
4 3.91%   
Robert Hue Parti communiste français 960,480 3.37%   
Bruno Mégret 
Mouvement national 
républicain 667,026 2.34%   
Christiane 
Taubira Parti radical de gauche 660,447 2.32%   
Corinne Lepage 
Citoyenneté action 
participation pour le XXIe 
siècle 
535,837 1.88%   
Christine Boutin 
Forum des républicains 
sociaux 339,112 1.19%   
Daniel 
Gluckstein Parti des travailleurs 132,686 0.47%   
Total (turnout 
71.6 %)  
28,498,4
71 
10000.
00% 
31,062,98
8 100 
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                    FIGURE 6: 2002 Presidential Election Voting Trends 
 First Round (April 
21st, 2002) 
Second Round (May 
5th, 2002) 
   
Registered Voters 41,191,169 41,191,169 
   
Actual Voters 29,495,733 (71.6%)  32,832,295 (79.9%)
   
Blank Votes 1,768,307 (5.99%) 1,768,307 (5.39%) 
   
Abstention 11,698,956 (28.4%) 8,357,688 (20.29%) 
 
Source: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/dossier/presidentielles/2002\ 
 
 
 
 
Votes
Abstentions
Blank Vote
Jean-Marie Le Pen
Jacques Chirac
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Figure 8: Summary of the 22 April and 6 May 2007 French presidential election results 
Candidates – Parties 1st round 
 
2nd round 
 
  
Votes % Votes % 
Nicolas Sarkozy Union pour un mouvement populaire 11,448,663 31.18% 18,983,138 53.06% 
Ségolène Royal Parti socialiste 9,500,112 25.87% 16,790,440 46.94% 
François Bayrou Union pour la démocratie française 6,820,119 18.57% 
  
Jean-Marie Le Pen Front national 3,834,530 10.44% 
  
Olivier Besancenot Ligue communiste révolutionnaire 1,498,581 4.08% 
  
Philippe de Villiers Mouvement pour la France 818,407 2.23% 
  
Marie-George Buffet Popular and anti-liberal Left 707,268 1.93% 
  
Dominique Voynet Les Verts 576,666 1.57% 
  
Arlette Laguiller Lutte ouvrière 487,857 1.33% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 4: In 2007 Sarkozy Takes Le Pen’s 2002 Voting Strongholds
2002 
Jacques Chirac 
Jean-Marie Le Pen 
Lionel Jospin 
Source:  
 
2007 
 
Nicolas Sarkozy
Ségolène Royale
François Bayrou
http://commons.wikimedia.org/ 
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